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SINGAPORE STRIVES TO ENHANCE SAFETY,
SECURITY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
IN ITS PORT AND IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA
AND SINGAPORE
Robert Beckman*

I. INTRODUCTION
This Article first examines the efforts of the port-city of Singapore to
enhance safety and to prevent ship-source pollution in its port and waters
by adopting and effectively implementing the international rules and
standards established in the conventions of the International Maritime
Organization (IMO). It then reviews the measures taken by Singapore since
2002 to enhance security in its port and its surrounding waters. This is
followed by an examination of how Singapore has worked together with
Indonesia and Malaysia to enhance safety, security, and environmental
protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Finally, it considers
what additional cooperative measures may be necessary to enhance
maritime security and minimize the threat of ship-source pollution in the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
The efforts of Singapore to enhance safety, security, and environmental
protection in its port and waters cannot be understood without a basic
comprehension of Singapore’s geography and the importance of shipping
to its economy. Singapore is a small city-state in Southeast Asia. At the
end of 2007, its total population was approximately 4.6 million, of which
about 3.6 million were citizens or permanent residents.1 Singapore was
founded by the British as a treaty port and became independent in 1965. It
consists of one main island and several nearby smaller islands. Its total

*. Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore.
1. DEP’T OF STATISTICS, REPUBLIC OF SING., YEARBOOK OF STATISTICS SINGAPORE 22
(2008), available at http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/people/hist/popn.html.
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land area is about 682.7 square kilometers. It has about 193 kilometers of
coastline and its sea area is less than ten square kilometers.2
Singapore is located at the end of the Malay Peninsula and at the
southern end of the Malacca Strait, which lies between the Indonesian
island of Sumatra and the peninsula of Malaysia, and is approximately 500
miles in length.3 To the north, Singapore is separated from the State of
Johor in Malaysia by the Johor Strait, which is thirty miles long and ranges
from three-quarters of a mile to three miles in width.4 To the south,
Singapore is separated from the Riau Islands of Indonesia by the Singapore
Strait, which runs for fifty miles from the end of the Malacca Strait in the
west to the South China Sea in the east. The Singapore Strait is about ten
miles wide but it narrows to less than one mile at Philips Channel near
Singapore.5
The Malacca Strait and the Singapore Strait are connected. They are
treated by the three littoral States of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore,
and by the IMO, as a single strait, which is referred to as the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore is one of the
busiest and most important straits in the world. It is on the main shipping
route between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, and it is vitally
important for trade and commerce between Europe, the Middle East, and
India to the west, and China, Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia to the east.
More than 60,000 vessels pass through the Straits annually, carrying half
the world’s oil flows and one-third of the world’s sea-borne trade.6
Singapore’s strategic location and natural deep-water harbor have
enabled it to develop its port and transform the city into a global sea
transportation hub. More than 200 shipping lines call on Singapore,7 and
on an average day there are approximately 1000 ships in port.8 As an

2. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE 2008 WORLD FACTBOOK (2008), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sn.html.
3. The Columbia Encyclopedia (6th ed. 2007), available at http://www.bartleyby.
com/65/ma/malaccast.html.
4. The Columbia Encyclopedia (6th ed. 2007), available at http://www.bartleyby.
com/65/jo/johorest.html.
5. The Columbia Encyclopedia (6th ed. 2007), available at http://www.bartley
by.com/65/si/singastr.html.
6. Raymond Lim, Minister for Transp. and Second Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Welcome Address at the Singapore Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:
Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection (Sept. 4, 2007).
7. Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore [hereinafter MPA], Home, News Centre,
Allies to Help Shipping Lines Enhance Competitiveness of Alliance Operations in
Singapore, http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/global_navigation/news_center/mpa_news/mpa_
news_detail.page?filename=nr050531.xml (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
8. Tay Lim Heng, Chief Executive of the Mar. and Port Auth. of Sing., Speech at the
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international maritime center, Singapore offers a full range of maritime
services, including cargo handling, bunkering, professional ship management and shipbroking services, and international legal and arbitration
expertise. Singapore has consistently ranked as the world’s busiest
container port.9 It is also a major importer of oil, a major oil refining
center, and one of the world’s largest bunkering ports.10
Singapore has major maritime interests as a flag State and as a port
State. The number of ships under the Singapore registry has increased
steadily in recent years and the registry is now ranked in the top ten of the
world’s largest ship registries.11
The maritime sector is a key sector of the Singapore economy. It is
estimated that there are more than 5000 maritime companies and
organizations in Singapore, employing close to 100,000 persons, and that
the maritime sector contributes approximately seven percent of Singapore’s
gross domestic product.12
Given the importance of the maritime sector to Singapore’s economy,
the safe and secure passage of ships through the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore is vital to its national interests. Singapore has also made a
serious effort to balance environmental and developmental matters, while
protecting its coastal and marine areas from all sources of pollution. It has
a very strong interest in ensuring that ships entering its port and passing
through its waters comply with international standards on ship-source
pollution.

World Hydrography Day Celebration and Signing of Letter of Intent Between MPA and
UKHO on Joint Hydrographic Initiatives (July 7, 2006), available at http://www.mpa.
gov.sg/sites/global_navigation/news_center/speeches/speeches_detail.page?filename=sp0
70706.xml.
9. See MPA, Home, Maritime Singapore, What Maritime Singapore Offers, Probusiness Environment, Access to Key Markets, http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/maritime_
singapore/what_maritime_singapore_offer/pro_business_environment/access_to_key_ma
rkets.page (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
10. MPA, Home, News Centre, Joint Oil Spill Exercise to Test Response Strategy,
http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/global_navigation/news_center/mpa_news/mpa_news_detai
l.page?filename=nr060929.xml (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
11. MPA, Industry Development, Singapore Registry of Ships, http://www.mpa
.gov.sg/industrydevelopment/srs/intro_benefits/intro.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2009)
[hereinafter Singapore Registry of Ships].
12. Rising to the Challenge: Up Close with Team Chairman Peter Ong, SING. MAR.
ILLUSTRATED (SPECIAL ISSUE) 5 (2007).
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II. SINGAPORE AND THE IMO CONVENTIONS ON SAFETY AND POLLUTION
A. The Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore
The Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) is the Singapore
agency responsible for implementing all IMO conventions. The MPA is
not a government department, although it comes under the purview of the
Ministry of Transport.13 It is a statutory board that was created in 1996 by
the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore Act.14 The MPA is
Singapore’s national sea transport representative and is responsible for
safeguarding Singapore’s maritime and port interests in the international
arena.15 It acts as the government’s adviser on matters relating to sea
transport, marine and port services, and facilities.16
The MPA represents Singapore’s interests at the IMO in London.
Singapore has been an elected Council member of the IMO since 1993, and
takes an active part in IMO meetings.17 One of the First Secretaries at the
Singapore Embassy in London is responsible for maritime affairs.18 Other
officers from the MPA travel to London to attend IMO meetings.
B. Singapore and IMO Conventions on Safety
and Ship-Source Pollution
The general policy of the MPA is to ensure that Singapore becomes a
party to all IMO conventions on navigational safety and protection of the
marine environment, and that every convention Singapore ratifies or
accedes to is effectively implemented and enforced from the day it enters
into force for Singapore. Singapore is a party to all of the major IMO
conventions on navigational safety, including the Convention on the 1972
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG),19 the

13. Ministry of Transport, Gov’t of Sing., Sea Transport, Regulations, http://www.mot.
gov.sg/seatransport/acts.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
14. Ch. 170A, Part II, § 4 (1996) (Sing.), available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg.
15. Id. § 7(1).
16. Id.
17. MPA, A SAFE, SECURE AND CLEAN PORT, available at http://www.mpa.gov.sg/
sites/pdf/infokit3.pdf.
18. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION [hereinafter IMO], COUNCIL WORKING
GROUP ON THE ORGANIZATION’S STRATEGIC P LAN, LIST OF PARTICIPANTS, available at
http://www.sjofartsverket.se/upload/17610/8-INF1.pdf.
19. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct.
20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, 1050 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter COLREG].
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1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),20 and
the 1978 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW).21
Singapore is the only State in Southeast Asia that is a party to all six
annexes to the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto
(MARPOL).22 Singapore intends to become one of the first States to ratify
the 2004 International Convention for the Control and Management of
Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments (Ballast Water).23 Although Singapore
is not a party to the 2001 International Convention on the Control of
Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships (Anti-Fouling),24 it has been
preparing the implementing legislation, and it is expected that it will
become a party to the Convention by the end of 2009.25
The marine pollution convention that seems to be presenting Singapore
with the greatest difficulty is the 1996 Protocol26 to the 1972 Convention
on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter.27 The MPA has been leading an interagency committee to study the
1996 Protocol for the past several years, but no decision has been made on

20. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47,
1184 U.N.T.S. 2 [hereinafter SOLAS].
21. International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping
for Seafarers, July 7, 1978, 1969 U.N.T.S. 41 [hereinafter STCW].
22. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973,
1340 U.N.T.S. 184, 12 I.L.M. 1319, amended by Protocol of 1978 Relating to the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, Feb. 17, 1978,
1340 U.N.T.S. 61, 17 I.L.M 546 [hereinafter MARPOL].
23. International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water
and Sediments, Feb. 13, 2004, [2005] A.T.N.I.F. 18, available at http://www.austlii.
edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/notinforce/2005/18.html [hereinafter Ballast Water]. See also
MPA, Home, Port & Shipping, Circulars & Notices, Shipping Circulars, International
Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, 2004
(BWM Convention), http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/port_and_shipping/circulars_and_notices/
shipping_circulars_detail.page?filename=sc09-10.xml (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
24. International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships,
Oct. 5, 2001, [2008] A.T.S. 15, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/
2008/15.html [hereinafter Anti-Fouling].
25. MPA, Circulars & Notices: Shipping Circulars, No. 22 of 2007, Dec. 18, 2007,
http://www.mpa.gov.sg/circulars_and_notices/shipping_circulars/sc07-22.htm (last visited
Mar. 9, 2009).
26. 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Nov. 7, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 7 [hereinafter 1996
Protocol].
27. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120.
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the question of accession to the Protocol. Singapore may be concerned
with how the 1996 Protocol will impact the regular dredging of its port
waters and shipping channels, and its use of dredging spoils for land
reclamation. Article 7 of the 1996 Protocol provides that it shall relate to
internal waters only to the extent provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3.
However, those paragraphs require a Contracting Party to adopt effective
permitting and regulatory measures to control the deliberate disposal of
wastes, and to provide the IMO with information on legislation and
institutional mechanisms regarding implementation, compliance, and
enforcement in marine internal waters. Given that Article 7 may have an
impact on the national land reclamation policy, the MPA will require
approval from the Ministry of National Development and the Ministry for
the Environment and Water Resources before Singapore can become a
party to the 1996 Protocol.28
With respect to contingency planning for spills of oil or hazardous and
noxious substances, Singapore is a party to the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC),29
and the 2000 Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to
Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances (OPRC-HNS
Protocol).30 Singapore is also a party to the three major IMO conventions
on liability and compensation: the 1992 International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1992 CLC),31 the 1992 International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (1992 Fund),32 and the 2001
International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution
Damage (Bunkers).33

28. See MPA, Home, Port & Shipping, Circulars & Notices, Shipping Circulars,
International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships (AFS
Convention), http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/port_and_shipping/circulars_and_
Notices/shipping_circulars_detail.page?filename=sc06-06.xml (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
29. International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation,
Nov. 30, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 733 [hereinafter OPRC].
30. Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents by
Hazardous and Noxious Substances, Mar. 15, 2000, [2003] A.T.N.I.F. 9, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/notinforce/2003/9.html [hereinafter OPRCHNS Protocol].
31. Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, Nov. 27, 1992, 1956 U.N.T.S. 255 [hereinafter 1992 CLC].
32. Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 27, 1992, 1953
U.N.T.S. 330 [hereinafter 1992 Fund].
33. International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, Mar.
23, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 1493 [hereinafter Bunker Convention].
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C. Implementation of IMO Conventions
In the past, Singapore acceded to IMO conventions only after they were
in force.34 However, in recent years, Singapore is reviewing IMO
conventions while they are being prepared, allowing it to become one of the
first States to sign and ratify them once they have been adopted. For
example, Singapore deposited its instrument of ratification for Annex VI
of MARPOL on August 10, 2000, and the Annex did not enter into force
until May 19, 2005.35
The MPA will not recommend that Singapore become a party to an
IMO convention until it is confident that it is able to carry out all of its
obligations under the convention from the date it enters into force for
Singapore. The legislation necessary to implement its obligations under the
convention is usually drafted and enacted before the convention enters into
force for Singapore.36 Implementing legislation is drafted by the MPA
officers working together with the Legislation Division of the Attorney
General’s Chambers. The implementing legislation is usually timed to
come into force in Singapore on the same day that the IMO convention
enters into force for Singapore. Once laws and regulations to implement
a convention become part of Singapore law, they will be enforced quite
vigorously from the day they come into operation. The MPA officers are
honest and efficient, and are supported by a judiciary that is renowned for
its efficiency and lack of corruption.37

34. Compare IMO, International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
1973, modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL), http://www.imo.org/
(last visited Mar. 31, 2009), and MPA, Home, News centre, Singapore Accedes To Annex
V of The International Convention For The Prevention of Pollution From Ships, 1973,
modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78), http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/global_
navigation/news_center/mpa_news/mpa_news_detail.page?filename=990610-.xml (last
visited Mar. 31, 2009).
35. International Maritime Organization, Annex VI of MARPOL 73/78: Regulations for
the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships and NOx Technical Code (1998) [hereinafter
MARPOL Annex VI].
36. Prevention of Pollution of the Sea Act, 1991 ch. 243 (Sing.) (Leg. History), available
at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg.
37. Singapore is ranked third in the world and first in Asia for having the least corruption
in its economy. Singapore Economic Development Board, Singapore Rankings, http://www.
sedb.com/edb/sg/en_uk/index/why_singapore/singapore_rankings.html (last visited Mar. 9,
2009). It is ranked in one study as the second most transparent country in the world and the
most transparent Asian country. Id. The Singapore judiciary and legal system also receive
high rankings in international studies. See Institute for Management Development, Ranking
of Singapore Legal Framework & Judiciary, http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/subcourts/
newsdetails.aspx?pageid=26601&cid=46598 (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
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The implementation of some IMO conventions by Singapore requires
the MPA to coordinate the actions of several government agencies or to
seek assistance from the private sector. For example, in fulfilling its
obligations under MARPOL, the MPA imposes an obligation on the Port
of Singapore Authority (PSA), and other terminal operators in Singapore,
to provide reception facilities for oil, oily waste, and garbage.38
The Singapore legislation that implements MARPOL and its six
annexes, as well as OPRC, is the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea
Act.39 The offenses under the Act demonstrate that Singapore regards
pollution by its ships and pollution of its waters as a serious matter. The
Act provides that if any discharge of oil or oily mixture occurs from a
Singapore ship into any part of the sea or from any ship into Singapore
waters, the master, the owner, and the agent of the ship shall each be guilty
of an offense, and shall each be liable, upon conviction, for a fine of up to
one-million Singapore dollars (approximately US $650,000) or subject to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or both.40
In order to effectively implement OPRC in oil spill contingency
planning, the MPA serves as the lead agency and collaborates with other
government agencies and non-governmental entities in preparing for and
combating oil spills.41 The Ministry of Environment and Water Resources
(MEWR) is responsible for shoreline cleanup and cleanup of any land
areas. The Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) mobilizes aircraft for reconnaissance and cleanup. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) provides
manpower for shoreline cleanup in large spills and facilitates immigration
clearance for foreign cleanup specialists and workers entering Singapore
to assist in the cleanup. The Immigration and Check-Points Authority
(ICA) facilitates customs clearance for equipment brought into Singapore
to assist in cleanup operations. The Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
(CAAS) assists in seaward rescue and provides fire-fighting equipment if
necessary. The Ministry of Health provides medical aid to people affected
by the fumes from a spill and advises on health matters relating to cleanup
operations. Finally, the Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority of Singapore

38. Prevention of Pollution of the Sea Act, 1991 ch. 243, § IV (Sing.), available at
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg.
39. Ch. 243 (1991) (Sing.), available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg.
40. Id. at § 3.
41. Zafrul Alam, Sing. First Sec’y Mar. Affairs, Singapore’s Recent Accession to the
OPRC Convention—How the Republic Discharges its Obligations under the Convention,
Presented to the International Oil Pollution Conference and Exhibition (Sept. 1-3, 1999), in
SING. MAR. & PORT J, 2000, at 49-55. The names of the government agencies have been
updated.
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(AVA) assesses damages to and provides strategies for the protection of
fish farms and other living resources. The fact that Singapore is a city-state
with only one level of government makes such coordination easier than in
large countries that must deal with local and state or provincial
governmental entities.
Many private companies are also involved in preparing for and fighting
oil spills under the leadership of the MPA. The PSA, the corporate body
which operates the port, supports cleanup operations by providing tugs,
manpower, and equipment.42 Petroleum companies, petro-chemical
companies, and oil storage companies operating in Singapore are required
by law to keep a stock of dispersants and certain equipment, including tugs
and booms, to assist in combating oil spills.43 The companies are also
required to provide logistics, equipment, and manpower if a spill occurs.44
In addition, if activated, oil spill cleanup companies based in Singapore
provide manpower, equipment, and expertise when a spill occurs.
The Singapore legislation giving effect to the CLC and Fund
conventions is the Merchant Shipping (Civil Liability and Compensation
for Oil Pollution) Act.45 The Bunkers convention was implemented by the
Merchant Shipping (Civil Liability and Compensation for Bunker Oil
Pollution) Act 2008.46 The MPA home page contains a very useful
memorandum setting out how each of the IMO conventions has been
implemented under Singapore law.47
D. Safety and Pollution Standards for Singapore Ships
Singapore is reputed for its quality ship registry, which is administered
by the MPA. The registry has been expanding by about ten percent per
year in recent years. Ships under the Singapore registry consistently have
a good safety record. They are inspected regularly to ensure that high
safety and pollution standards are maintained, and regular surveys are
performed in accordance with IMO conventions. In addition to the surveys
conducted by the MPA, nine internationally recognized classification

42. See Barbara Leitch Lepoer, ed., Singapore: A Country Study, Geography,
Washington GPO for the Library of Congress, 1989, available at http://countrystudies.us/
singapore/13.htm.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Ch. 180 (1997) (Sing.), available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg.
46. No. 24 (2008) (Sing.), available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg.
47. MPA, THE MARITIME LEGISLATION OF SINGAPORE (2008), available at http://www.
mpa.gov.sg/circulars_and_notices/legislation/00_introduction.pdf.
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societies with offices in Singapore are authorized to survey and issue
tonnage, safety, and pollution prevention certificates to Singapore ships.48
E. Safety in Port and Singapore Waters
The MPA “employs state-of-the-art technology to ensure that shipping
traffic, coastal and port development projects, and siltation do not compromise navigational safety or adversely affect the marine environment.”
This includes an advanced, radar-based, Vessel Traffic Information System
(VTIS). The MPA operates two fully-integrated Port Operations Control
Centers, which employ the VTIS system to provide navigational
information to ships within Singapore waters and ships passing through the
Singapore Strait. The VTIS system can track up to 5000 vessels in realtime, and it is integrated with electronic navigational chart displays as well
as synchronized voice, track, and data recording.49 Safety in Singapore
waters is further enhanced through other navigational aids such as the
Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS), “which helps ships to fix
their positions more accurately, and STRAITREP, a mandatory ship
reporting system for ships transiting the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.”50
III. MEASURES TO ENHANCE MARITIME SECURITY
A. Implementation of 2002 IMO Measures on Maritime Security
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States were
unequivocally condemned by the United Nations Security Council and by
most members of the international community. The attacks triggered an
alacritous response from the international community to review the rules
of international law governing terrorist activities and to increase
international cooperation for the prevention and suppression of terrorist
activities. The IMO, for instance, undertook a thorough review of measures

48. Singapore Registry of Ships, supra note 11. The nine classification societies are:
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS); Bureau Veritas (BV); China Classification Society
(CCS); Det Norske Veritas (DNV); Germanischer Lloyd (GL); Korean Register of Shipping
(KRS); Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (LRS); Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (NKK); and Registro
Italiano Navle (RINA). Id.
49. MPA, Safety and Environment: Introduction, http://www.mpa.gov.sg/safety
environment/intro/intro.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
50. See also STRAITREP, infra text accompanying note 107.
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to combat acts of violence and crime at sea.51 At the Diplomatic
Conference on Maritime Security on December 9-13, 2002, participants
adopted eleven resolutions containing various measures to strengthen
maritime security and prevent and suppress acts of terrorism against
international shipping.52 A new International Ship and Port Facility Code
(ISPS Code) was adopted through amendments to SOLAS.53 The ISPS
Code, which entered into force on July 1, 2004, contains detailed
mandatory security-related requirements for governments, port authorities,
and shipping companies. It also contains a series of non-mandatory
guidelines on how to meet the mandatory security requirements.
Singapore moved quickly, beginning in 2002, to implement the ISPS
Code. Because of the wide powers that have been given to the MPA under
the Merchant Shipping Act54 and the Maritime and Port Authority Act,55 a
new Act of Parliament was not required. Under section 100 of the
Merchant Shipping Act, the MPA, with the approval of the Minister, may
issue regulations to give effect to the provisions of any international
convention concerning or relating to ships’ safety to which Singapore is a
party. The MPA also has wide powers, under section 100 of the Maritime
and Port Authority Act, to issue regulations necessary to carry out the
purposes of the Act.
Beginning in 2002, technical and legal experts from the MPA, in
consultation with the Legislation Division of the Attorney General’s
Chambers, began drafting regulations to implement the 2002 SOLAS
amendments. Following the common practice in Singapore, the regulations
were promulgated in early 2004, but it was provided that they would enter
into force on July 1, 2004, the date of entry into force of the amendments
to SOLAS.56 To ensure that all affected persons and companies could be
in full compliance by July 1, 2004, the MPA issued circulars and presented

51. At the twenty-second Assembly meeting in November 2001, it was agreed to hold a
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security in December 2002 to adopt new regulations
to enhance ship and port security. Id. The Maritime Safety Committee and other IMO
bodies worked for more than a year to prepare for the Conference. Id.
52. IMO, Diplomatic Conference in Maritime Security: 9-13 December 2002: IMO
Adopts Comprehensive Maritime Security Measures, http://www.imo.org/About/
mainframe.asp?topic_id=583&doc_id=2689 (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
53. MPA, Circulars & Notices: Maritime Security – Amendments to SOLAS 74 Adopted
by the IMO Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security Held in London in December
2002, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2004/29.html (last visited Mar. 9,
2009).
54. Ch. 179 (1996) (Sing.), available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg.
55. Ch. 170A, Part II, § 4 (1996) (Sing.), available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg.
56. Shipping Circular 11 of 2004, see infra text accompanying note 64.
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seminars beginning in 2003 to advise ship owners and port facility
operators about the SOLAS amendments and their entry into force on July
1, 2004. The circulars relating to the SOLAS amendments on maritime
security included the following:
•

•

•

Marine Circular No. 3 of 2003, Maritime Security, March 12,
2003, highlighting the essential elements of the 2002
amendments to SOLAS, and putting shipowners, ship
managers, masters, and officers of Singapore ships on notice
that new measures would be required after July 1, 2004;57
Marine Circular No. 8 of 2003, Early Implementation of the
Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security, May 23,
2003, drawing the shipowners’ attention to the special
measures to enhance maritime security and to their entry into
force on July 1, 2004 and to the fact that no extensions would
be given on the implementation dates of July 1, 2004;
reminding them that process and documentation required under
the ISPS Code must be in place by July 1, 2004; and warning
them that from July 1, 2004, ships not found in compliance
with the maritime security requirements will be subject to
control and compliance measures such as delaying the ship,
detention of the ship, and expulsion of the ship from port;58
Marine Circular No. 9 of 2003, Appointment of Recognised
Security Organisations (RSOs), March 23, 2003, informing
those concerned that the nine classification societies which
have been appointed by the MPA as the Recognized
Organizations for surveys and certification for safety and
pollution prevention requirements for Singapore ships may
apply to the MPA for appointment as Recognized Security
Organizations (RSOs) under the ISPS Code, and that appointed
RSOs will be authorized to approve ship security plans,
conduct ship security audits, and issue International Ship
Security Certificates (ISSC) to Singapore ships in accordance
with the ISPS Code on behalf of the MPA;59

57. MPA, Circulars & Notices: Maritime Security – Amendments to SOLAS 74 Adopted
by the IMO Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security Held in London in December
2002, http://www.mpa.gov.sg/circulars_and_notices/maritimesecurity_notices/mc03-03.
htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
58. MPA, Circulars & Notices, Maritime Security: Early Implementation of the Special
Measures to Enhance Maritime Security, http://www.mpa.gov.sg/circulars_and_notices/
maritimesecurity_notices/mc03-08.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
59. MPA, Circulars & Notices, Maritime Security: Appointment of Recognised Security
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Marine Circular No. 10 of 2003, Maritime Security Training
for Company Security Officers and Ship Security Officers,
June 5, 2003, advising owners and managers to send persons
designated to be company security officers or ship security
officers for maritime security training at an early date so that
they can implement the ISPS Code requirements before the
requirements enter into force on July 1, 2004, and
recommending guidelines to be followed when selecting a
maritime security training provider;60
Port Marine Circular No. 26 of 2003, SOLAS Chapter XI-2,
Reg. 10—Requirements for Port Facilities, July 9, 2003,
advising the owners and operators of port facilities of the
measures adopted by the 2002 SOLAS amendments, advising
that port facilities are required to develop and maintain a port
facility security plan on the basis of a port facility security
assessment and to conduct drills and exercises with respect to
the port facility security plan, and advising that owners and
officers are to designate port facility security officers who are
to undergo training in maritime security in accordance with the
guidance in Part B of the ISPS Code;61
Marine Circular No. 21 of 2003, Marking of Ship’s
Identification Number, October 13, 2003, advising that the
2002 amendments to SOLAS require “all passenger ships of
100 GT and upwards and all cargo ships of 300 GT and
upwards to be permanently marked with an identification
number (IMO number),” and urging that shipowners make
arrangements to have their ships marked as soon as possible so
as to meet the July 1, 2004 deadline;62
Shipping Circular No. 7 of 2004, Continuous Synopsis Record,
March 9, 2004, advising that the 2002 SOLAS amendments
require that applicable ships must carry on board a

Organisations, http://www.mpa.gov.sg/circulars_and_notices/maritimesecur
ity_notices/mc03-09.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
60. MPA, Circulars & Notices: Maritime Security, Maritime Security Training for
Company Security Officers and Ship Security Officers, http://www.mpa. gov.
sg/circulars_and_notices/maritimesecurity_notices/mc03-10.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
61. MARITIME AND PORT AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE, SOLAS CHAPTER XI-2, REG. 10,
REQUIREMENTS FOR PORT FACILITIES (2003), available at http://www.mpa.gov.sg/
circulars_and_notices/pdfs/pc03-26.pdf.
62. MPA, Circulars & Notices, Maritime Security: Marking of Ship’s Identification
Number (IMO), http://www.mpa.gov.sg/circulars_and_notices/maritimesecurity_not
ices/mc03-21.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
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‘Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR), which is intended to
provide an on-board record of the history of the ship with
respect to the information recorded therein,’ and advising
owners to apply for a CSR as soon as they have obtained an
ISSC;63
Shipping Circular 11 of 2004, Legislation to Give Effect to the
Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security, April 21,
2004, advising that the Merchant Shipping (Safety
Convention) (Amendment) Regulations 2004 and the Maritime
and Port Authority of Singapore (Port) (Amendment)
Regulations 2004 give effect to the 2002 SOLAS amendments
and the ISPS Code, and that beginning on July 1, 2004, ships
will be subject to control and compliance measures on
maritime security.64

Because of this careful preparation, Singapore was ready to implement
the 2002 Amendments when they entered into force on July 1, 2004.
B. Other Measures to Enhance Maritime Security in Singapore Waters
More than 12,000 oil tankers and 3000 chemical tankers call at
Singapore annually.65 Given that a significant amount of oil and chemicals
are shipped in and out of Singapore, safeguarding its waters and port
terminals against security threats has long been a top priority of the MPA
and other relevant government agencies. It became an even higher priority
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States.
Therefore, beginning in 2002, Singapore took a series of measures to
enhance port and maritime security.
First, Singapore security agencies conducted risk assessments of its
maritime transport sector and recommended measures to increase security,
including port perimeter security; access control via security passes;

63. MPA, Circulars & Notices, Maritime Security: Continuous Synopsis Record,
http://www.mpa.gov.sg/circulars_and_notices/maritimesecurity_notices/sc04-07.htm (last
visited Mar. 9, 2009).
64. MPA, Circulars & Notices, Maritime Security: Legislation to Give Effect to the
Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security and Issues Relating Thereto, http://www.
mpa.gov.sg/circulars_and_notices/maritimesecurity_notices/sc04-11.htm (last visited Mar.
9, 2009).
65. MPA, Maritime & Port Security: Introduction, http://www.mpa.gov.sg/
maritimeportsecurity/maritime_security.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
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random personnel, baggage and vehicle checks; and closed circuit
monitoring of port facilities.66
Second, Singapore increased measures to protect vital installations and
vulnerable areas within the port limits such as petrochemical installations,
oil terminals, anchorage areas for liquid nitrogen, liquid petroleum, and
crude and chemical gas carriers. The measures include the establishment
of prohibited or restricted access zones around vital installations and
dangerous areas. Furthermore, Singapore increased security measures for
cruise ships and their passengers as well as other susceptible ships, such as
gas and large crude carriers.67
Third, Singapore established the Immigration and Checkpoints
Authority (ICA) in order to merge the border control functions of
Singapore Immigration and Registration and the Customs and Excise
Department into one entity and provide an integrated command over all
aspects of checkpoint operations.68
Fourth, Singapore established a Maritime Security Committee comprising representatives from the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Home
Affairs and Transport, as well as the intelligence and defense technology
agencies. This inter-Ministerial Committee develops and implements the
national strategy for maritime security and ensures interagency
coordination.69
Fifth, the Singapore Navy began to conduct escorts of selected high
value merchant vessels, such as liquid natural gas (LNG) carriers and oil
tankers, through Singapore waters.70
Sixth, the Singapore Navy formed special Accompanying Sea Security
Teams to safeguard vessels in Singapore waters. Beginning in April 2005,
armed security teams of up to eight persons began to board selected vessels
while in Singapore waters. The teams include personnel trained as seamen,
marine engineers, and radio operators, allowing them to take control of a
vessel if necessary.71

66. Home Team Speeches, Ministry of Home Affairs, Reply to Question in Parliament
on Maritime Terrorist Threats (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.mha.gov.sg/news_
details.aspx?nid=OTI0-%2fr9a3iqQy5o%3d (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
67. Id.
68. Press Release, Ministry of Home Affairs, Formation of the Immigration and
Checkpoints Authority (ICA) (Dec. 14, 2002), http://www.mha.gov.sg/news_details.
aspx?nid=OTIw-Tc%2fa1cS%2bqLo%3d (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
69. Chew Men Leong, Navies and Maritime Security – A Republic of Singapore Navy
Perspective, 33 POINTER 5, 7 (2007), available at http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/
publications/pointer/journals/2007/v33n3.html.
70. Id. at 8.
71. Joshua Ho, The Security of Regional Sea Lanes 12 (Inst. of Strategic Studies Sing.,
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Seventh, to track small craft below 300 tons that are not required by
IMO regulations to employ automatic identification systems (AIS),
Singapore instituted a Harbour Craft Transponder System that enables it to
track small craft in Singapore waters.72
C. Cooperative Measures to Combat Piracy and
Armed Robbery Against Ships
In 2004 and 2005, Singapore cooperated with Indonesia and Malaysia
to enhance maritime security in the Straits by combating piracy and armed
robbery against ships. The “piracy” issue has long plagued the region.73
The applicable rules of international law on jurisdiction over attacks at sea
have contributed to the problem. Under the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter LOS Convention),74 an
attack on a ship is ‘piracy’ only if it meets the conditions in Article 101,
one of which is that the attack must take place on the high seas or in an
exclusive economic zone.75 Most attacks on ships in or near the Straits take
place in a port, in the territorial sea of one of the three littoral States, or in
the archipelagic waters of Indonesia. Such attacks are not piracy.76 They
are classified by the IMO as “armed robbery against ships.”77 The
difference is significant because ships of all States can board pirate ships

Working Paper No. 81, 2005).
72. Id.; Port Marine Circular No. 22 of 2006, Harbour Craft Transponder System
(HARTS), Dec. 11, 2006, available at http://www.mpa.gov.sg/circulars_and_notices/
pdfs/pc06-22.pdf.
73. See generally Robert Beckman, Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
in Southeast Asia: The Way Forward, 33 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 317 (2002) (providing
excellent background material on this problem).
74. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter LOS Convention]. As of February 5, 2009, there are 157 signatories to the LOS
Convention, including the three littoral States of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.
United Nations, Ocean and Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists of Accessions and
Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements as of 05 February 2009,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological _lists_of_ratifications.htm (last
visited Mar. 9, 2009). The only major stakeholders in the Straits who are not parties are the
United States and Thailand. Id.
75. LOS Convention, supra note 74, art. 58 (providing that the provisions on piracy
apply in the exclusive economic zone).
76. See ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS 10 tbl.4
(2007).
77. IMO, FOCUS ON IMO, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA (2000),
http://www.imo.org/includes/blast_bindoc.asp?doc_id=433&format=PDF (last visited Mar.
9, 2009).
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and arrest the pirates on the high seas or in the exclusive economic zone,78
but if an attack takes place in the territorial sea or in archipelagic waters,
the only State with the authority to exercise jurisdiction by arresting the
perpetrators is the coastal State.79 Indonesia and Malaysia are highly
sensitive about their sovereignty and are not willing to allow foreign ships
to patrol or to exercise jurisdiction over “pirates” in waters under their
sovereignty.
However, the three littoral States of Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Singapore took steps, beginning in 2004, to enhance cooperation to combat
piracy and armed robbery against ships. These efforts have resulted in a
decrease in the piracy incidents in 2007 and 2008.80 In July 2004, the
defense forces of the three littoral States launched trilateral Malacca Straits
Sea Patrols in order to provide a constant naval presence in the Straits.81
The coordinated patrols involve ships from the three littoral States
patrolling within their own waters but in a coordinated manner and with
enhanced information sharing.82 In September 2005, the three States began
to conduct “Eyes in the Sky” aerial patrols in the Straits.83 On April 21,
2006, these arrangements were formalized by Defense Chiefs of the three
States agreeing to written Malacca Straits Patrols Standard Operating
Procedures (SOP).84 The sea patrols do permit “hot pursuit” across
territorial sea boundaries, but they contain a “hand-off mechanism” to deal
with cross-boundary enforcement.85 In addition, Indonesia and Singapore
have been collaborating since 2005 to share information in order to enhance
surveillance and security along their common border in the Singapore
Strait.86

78. LOS Convention, supra note 74, art. 105.
79. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on Piracy, ¶ 152, delivered
to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/53/456 (Oct. 5, 1998) (“Incidents of piracy and armed
robbery in the territorial sea or in port areas are perceived as crimes against the State and are
thus subject to its national laws.”).
80. ICC INT’L MARITIME BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS 5 tbl.1,
22 (2007).
81. See Chew Men Long, supra note 69.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 10.
84. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Singapore Statement on Enhancement of Safety, Security
and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, IMO Doc.
IMO/SGP 1/4 (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.mpa.gov.sg/infocentre/pdf/spore_
statement.pdf [hereinafter Singapore Statement].
85. Victor Huang, Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia – Outsiders Not
Welcome?, 33 POINTER 27, 37 (2007), available at http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/
publications/pointer/journals/2007/v33n3.html.
86. Irvin Lim, Comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness – An Idea Whose Time Has
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The Japanese government led an initiative in 2002 and 2003 to
establish a regional mechanism to combat piracy and armed robbery against
ships.87 The result is an agreement known as the 2004 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in
Asia (ReCAAP).88 An Information Sharing Centre (ISC) based in
Singapore is established under the Agreement, which was signed by sixteen
countries.89 Unfortunately, neither Indonesia nor Malaysia has ratified the
agreement, although both have indicated that they will cooperate with the
ISC.90 The reasons for their failure to ratify the agreement have not been
stated publicly, but it is understood that both Indonesia and Malaysia have
been cooperating with the ISC, to some degree, at an operational level. It
is not possible, at this time, to evaluate the impact or effectiveness of the
ReCAAP ISC because the number of attacks on ships in and near the Straits
has dropped dramatically in recent years.
D. Cooperation with U.S.-led Maritime Security Initiatives
After the United States was attacked on September 11, 2001, it took
several initiatives to enhance maritime security beyond the framework of
international organizations such as the IMO. These initiatives were based
on coalitions of willing partners with similar concerns about maritime
security.
On September 20, 2002, the government of Singapore signed a
declaration to join the Container Security Initiative (CSI).91 Under the

Come?, 33 POINTER 13, 19 (2007), available at http://www.mi ndef.gov.sg/imindef/
publications/pointer/journals/2007/v33n3.html.
87. RICHARD J. ELLINGS ET AL., STRATEGIC ASIA 2002-03: ASIA AFTERSHOCKS 110
(2008).
88. Nov. 11, 2004, entered into force Sept. 4, 2006, available at http://www.recaap.org/
index_home.html.
89. The sixteen countries are the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam,
the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India, the
Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of
Singapore, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of Thailand, and
the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.
90. In paragraph 9 of the 2005 Joint Ministerial statement of the Ministers of Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore in Batam, Indonesia on August 2, 2005, the Ministers took note of
the establishment of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center in Singapore. The Statement
also states that “[i]n this regard, the Ministers of Indonesia and Malaysia indicated their
countries’ preparedness to cooperate with the Center.”
91. Press Release, U.S. Customs Serv., Singapore Signs Declaration to Join U.S.
Customs Anti-Terrorist Container Security Initiative (Sept. 20, 2002), available at
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agreement, Singapore became the first CSI port in Asia. The arrangement
involves placing a small team of U.S. customs inspectors in Singapore to
work with Singapore authorities to pre-screen and target high-risk cargo
containers bound for America. In addition, Singapore has both implemented an enhanced export control system, to ensure the security of
containers going through its port, and installed radiographic scanners to
screen containers.
The United States announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
in May 2003. The main purpose of the PSI is to interdict shipments of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related goods to terrorists and
countries of proliferation concern.92 Singapore was not among the original
States in the PSI.93 It joined in 2004,94 and in August 2005, it hosted the
first PSI exercise in Southeast Asia.95
Several States in Asia, including Indonesia, Malaysia, China, and South
Korea, have expressed reservations and concerns about the PSI. One of the
main concerns is that the United States has not, in their view, been clear on
whether interdictions and boardings under the PSI will be conducted in a
matter that is consistent with the LOS Convention. The fact that the United
States is not a party to the LOS Convention has exacerbated this problem.96
E. Singapore Initiatives to Cooperate on Maritime Issues
One of the most important issues States must address, in order to deal
with low-probability, high-consequence events such as terrorist attacks, is
interagency coordination. Interagency coordination is necessary both
horizontally, between agencies of the national government, and vertically,
between national and local government agencies. National coordinating

http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2002/020923/epf111.htm.
92. See generally U.S. Dept. of State, Proliferation Security Initiative, http://ww
w.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2009) (providing additional information
on the PSI).
93. The ten countries that originally joined with the United States are Australia, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
See Press Release, Gov’t of Sing., Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) Participates in
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise (Jan. 11, 2004) add. (Factsheet), available
at http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/newsand_events/nr /2004/ jan/11jan04 _fs.html.
94. Id.
95. Press Release, Gov’t of Sing., Singapore Hosts Proliferation Security Initiative
Exercise (Aug. 15, 2005), available at http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_
events/nr/2005/aug/15aug05_nr2.html.
96. Huang, supra note 85, at 33-35. See also Mark J. Valencia, The Proliferation
Security Initiative: A Glass Half-Full, ARMS CONTROL TODAY (June 2007), available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/Valencia (providing a critical analysis of the PSI).
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agencies must do more than coordinate the actions of the various national
government agencies. They must also serve as the focal point for international cooperation and interoperability between States to promote maritime security. Singapore, recognizing the need for interagency coordination, established the Maritime Security Committee.
To further enhance interagency coordination, the Singapore government established the Maritime Command and Control Centre (Changi C2
Centre) in March 2007 to deal with the threat of maritime terrorism. The
Changi C2 Centre, which is expected to become operational in 2009, will
enhance Singapore’s maritime security capabilities by furthering multiagency cooperation and interoperability among national maritime agencies.
The Changi C2 Centre will house the Singapore Maritime Security Centre
(SMSC), an Information Fusion Centre, and a Multinational Operations and
Exercise Centre.
The SMSC will bring together elements from key domestic maritime
agencies, such as the Republic of Singapore Navy, the Maritime and Port
Authority of Singapore, and the Police Coast Guard under one roof. The
SMSC will plan its maritime security operations from a common room
known as the Inter-Agency Co-ordination Centre in the event of maritime
incidents or crises.
The Information Fusion Centre (IFC) will facilitate proactive sharing
and fusion of information to enable analysis, planning, and coordination of
maritime responses in a more collaborative and networked manner. It will
house the necessary computer networks to fuse, analyze, and disseminate
information shared by participating militaries and agencies. The IFC will
also enable international cooperation and interoperability with other States
in order to promote maritime security in the region. The Multinational
Operations and Exercise Centre (MOEC) will support the planning and
conduct of bilateral and multilateral exercises or operations. It will also
function as a Maritime Security Centre for the conduct of regional maritime
security operations, or as a regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster
Relief Centre. The Changi C2 Centre will enable Singapore to enhance
national and international cooperation on maritime security. Singapore will
be able to collate and share maritime information with international and
regional partners to enhance awareness of the maritime security situation.
To further the enhancement of maritime security cooperation among
navies in the region, the Singapore Navy has developed an Internet-based
Regional Maritime Information Exchange (ReMIX) portal to promote

2009]

The Port of Singapore: Recent Developments

187

information sharing among the navies of the Western Pacific Naval
Symposium.97
III. THE CO-OPERATIVE MECHANISM FOR THE STRAITS OF
MALACCA AND SINGAPORE
A. History of Cooperation by the Littoral States in the Straits
Because of its close geographic proximity to Indonesia and Malaysia
and to the Straits, it is not possible for Singapore to enhance safety,
security, and environmental protection from ship-source pollution without
cooperation from its neighbors. The three littoral States of Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Singapore have been cooperative toward the Straits since the
1970s. Most of the cooperation on navigational safety and ship-source
pollution is through a body of technical operational experts from the three
littoral States known as the Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG).
The TTEG meets regularly to coordinate policies relating to safety of
navigation and environmental protection in the Straits.98
In February 1977, a Ministerial meeting of the three littoral States
adopted recommendations on the Straits and submitted them to the InterGovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO).99 On November
14, 1977, the IMCO Assembly adopted Resolution A.375(X), Navigation
through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.100 The resolution mandated
a new routing system for the Straits which included traffic separation
schemes, deep-water routes, and rules for relating to under-keel clearance for
deep-draft vessels. Annex V of the Resolution contained the Rules for
Vessels Navigating Through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
Passage in the Straits is now governed by Part III of the LOS
Convention on straits used for international navigation. Part III gives ships
of all States the right of transit passage through the Straits,101 and such

97. Lim, supra note 86, at 18.
98. See Robert Beckman, The Establishment of a Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits
of Malacca and Singapore under Article 43 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, in THE FUTURE OF OCEAN REGIME-BUILDING: ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO DOUGLAS
M. JOHNSTON 233 (Aldo Chircop, Ted L. McDorman & Susan J. Rolston eds., 2009)
(providing a detailed examination of the history of the Co-operative Mechanism).
99. IMCO is now known as the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
100. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Navigation Through the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore, IMO Assemb. Res. A.375(X) (Nov. 14, 1977) (on file with the Ocean and
Coastal Law Journal).
101. See LOS Convention, supra note 74, art. 38.
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passage cannot be impeded or suspended.102 However, all ships exercising
the right of transit passage are required to comply with generally accepted
international rules and standards on the safety of navigation and the
prevention of pollution from ships.103 This means, in effect, that all ships
transiting the Straits must comply with all of the IMO conventions on
safety and ship-source pollution that have been generally accepted. The
right of the littoral States to unilaterally regulate ships exercising the right
of transit passage is severely limited: the LOS Convention provides that
they may only give effect to generally accepted international regulations.104
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have been cooperating with each
other and with the IMO in accordance with the LOS Convention to enhance
safety in the Straits. For example, upon the recommendation of the three
littoral States, the traffic separation scheme for the Straits was revised and
extended in 1998 by the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the IMO.105
In 1998, the three littoral States also proposed to the IMO that a mandatory
ship reporting system be adopted in the Straits. The MSC, acting in
accordance with Regulation V/8-1(h) of SOLAS,106 adopted resolution
MSC.73(69) on May 19, 1998, establishing a mandatory ship reporting
system known as “STRAITREP” for the Straits.107
As security in ports and ships was enhanced under the measures
adopted by the IMO in 2002, concern increased about the risk of terrorist
attacks on vital sea lanes such as the Straits. At the same time, there was
a significant increase in the number of incidents of piracy and armed
robbery against ships in the Straits.108
The impetus for specific action to establish a new cooperative
mechanism for the Straits came from the Secretary General of the IMO
with the support of the IMO Council. At the IMO Council’s ninety-third

102. Id. art. 44.
103. Id. art. 39.
104. See id. art. 42. See also id. art. 21 (setting forth the powers of coastal states to adopt
laws and regulations in the areas of their territorial sea not subject to Part III).
105. See Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], New and Amended Existing Traffic Separation
Schemes, IMO Doc. COLREG.2/Cir.44 (May 26, 1998) (on file with the Ocean and Coastal
Law Journal).
106. SOLAS, supra note 20, Chapter V. Safety of Navigation, Regulation 8-1. This
regulation on ship reporting systems was added to SOLAS by Maritime Safety Committee
Resolution MSC.31 (63) adopted on May 23, 1994.
107. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Mandatory Ship Reporting Systems, Annex I, IMO Res.
MSC.73(69) (May 19, 1998) (on file with the Ocean and Coastal Law Journal) (describing
the mandatory ship reporting system in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore).
108. ICC INT’L MARITIME BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS,
ANNUAL REPORT, 1 JANUARY – 31 DECEMBER 2004 17 (rev. ed. 2005).
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session in October 2004, the Secretary General submitted a document that
analyzed the key issues involved in protecting vital shipping lanes against
terrorist attacks.109 The document included an annex containing a profile
of the Straits. The IMO Council agreed that the organization could play a
greater role in the protection of shipping lanes of strategic importance and
significance. As part of his efforts to push forward collaboration on
maritime security, the Secretary General initiated an IMO-sponsored
meeting to be hosted by Indonesia in September 2005. The purpose of the
meeting was to provide an opportunity for the littoral States, user States,
and other stakeholders to work to enhance the safety of navigation,
environmental protection, and overall security in the Straits.110
B. The 2005 Batam Joint Ministerial Statement
In August 2005, one month before the IMO-sponsored meeting in
Jakarta, the Foreign Ministers of the three littoral States met in Batam,
Indonesia to discuss matters pertaining to the safety of navigation,
environmental protection, and maritime security in the Straits.111 This was
only the fourth trilateral Ministerial meeting of the three littoral States on
matters relating to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and the first since
1977.112
The Batam Joint Ministerial Statement (2005 Batam Statement)113 sets
out the common position of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore on the
respective roles of the littoral States, user States, and other stakeholders in
enhancing safety, security, and environmental protection in the Straits. The
Statement reaffirms that the three littoral States have sovereignty in the
Straits and the primary responsibility for the safety of navigation,
environmental protection, and maritime security.114 At the same time, the

109. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Protection of Vital Shipping Lanes, IMO Doc. C 93/15
(Oct. 7, 2004) (on file with the Ocean and Coastal Law Journal) [hereinafter Protection of
Vital Shipping Lanes].
110. Efthimios E. Mitropolous, Sec’y Gen., IMO, Keynote Address at the ASEAN
Regional Forum Conference: Regional Co-operation in Maritime Security (Mar. 2, 2005)
(transcript available at ASEAN Regional Forum Conference, http://www.imo.org/
Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id =1028&doc.id=4777) (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
111. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], The Batam Statement of the 4th Tripartite Ministerial
Meeting of the Littoral States on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, para. 1, IMO Doc.
IMO/SGP 1/INF.3 (Aug. 2, 2005) (on file with the Ocean and Coastal Law Journal)
[hereinafter 2005 Batam Statement].
112. Id. para. 2.
113. 2005 Batam Statement, supra note 111.
114. Id. para. 3.

190

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:2

statement acknowledges the interests of user States and relevant
international agencies such as the IMO, and the role they could play in
respect to the Straits.115 It also states that any cooperative measures taken
in the Straits must be in conformity with international law, including the
LOS Convention.116
With respect to the possible roles of user States and other stakeholders
in cooperative arrangements, the 2005 Batam Statement provides that,
bearing in mind the responsibility and burden of littoral States and the
interests of user States, the Ministers welcome the assistance of the user
States, relevant international agencies, and the shipping community in the
areas of capacity building, training and technology transfer, and other forms
of assistance in accordance with the LOS Convention.117
The 2005 Batam Statement recognizes the importance of the tripartite
Ministerial meeting in providing the overall framework for cooperation.118
The Ministers agreed that they should meet on a more regular basis with
senior officials to address relevant issues in a timely manner.119 Additionally, it was agreed that such meetings may include, if necessary, representatives of other relevant agencies to the respective littoral States.120
C. IMO-Sponsored Meetings in Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore
The IMO-sponsored meeting in Jakarta was held September 7-8, 2005,
and was attended by over thirty States as well as international organizations
and international non-government organizations.121 The statement from the
meeting, known as the Jakarta Statement,122 identified several points of
agreement relating to safety and environmental protection in the Straits.
First, the work of the TTEG123 on safety of navigation should be supported

115. Id. para. 4.
116. Id.
117. Id. para. 9.
118. Id. para. 5.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Jakarta Statement on Enhancement of Safety, Security
and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, IMO Doc.
IMO/JKT 1/2 (Sept. 8, 2005) (on file with the Ocean and Coastal Law Journal) [hereinafter
Jakarta Statement].
122. Id.
123. See Press Release, MPA Singapore, Work And Close Co-Operation Of The Tripartite
Technical Experts Group (TTEG) Have Contributed Significantly To The Safety Of
Navigation In The Straits Of Malacca And Singapore – MPA Hosts 25th Anniversary
Celebration Of The Tteg (May 9, 2000), available at http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/global_
navigation/newscenter/mpa_news/mpa_news_ detail.page?filen ame=000509.xml. The
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and encouraged.124 Second, the three littoral States should establish a
mechanism for regular meetings with user States, the shipping industry, and
other stakeholders.125 These meetings would address the issues of safety,
security, and environmental protection in the Straits, facilitate cooperation,
and explore possible options for burden-sharing.126 Third, the three littoral
States should establish and enhance mechanisms for information exchange
within and between States to enhance both maritime domain awareness and
cooperative measures.127 It was agreed that, where possible, these mechanisms should build on existing arrangements such as the TTEG mechanism.128
Another meeting was held September 18-20, 2006, in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.129 At the Kuala Lumpur meeting, representatives from the three
littoral States presented papers and presentations that outlined the elements
of the Co-operative Mechanism.130
The IMO and the government of Singapore convened a third, and final,
meeting on Enhancement of Safety, Security and Environmental Protection
in the Straits of Malacca on September 4-6, 2007.131 The product of the
meeting was the Singapore Statement, which affirmed that the littoral
States have sovereignty, jurisdiction, and territorial integrity over the
Straits and primary responsibility for safety, security, and environmental
protection in the Straits. 132 At the same time, the Singapore Statement
acknowledged the role played by the IMO, user States, shipping industry,
and other stakeholders in cooperating with littoral States to promote and
enhance safety of navigation, environmental protection, and the
uninterrupted flow of traffic in the Straits.133 The statement invites the
IMO to participate in the Co-operative Mechanism, continue cooperation

TTEG is a group of technical experts from the three littoral States of Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore. The TTEG was established in 1975, and meets regularly to coordinate policies
relating to safety of navigation and environmental protection in the straits.
124. Jakarta Statement, supra note 121.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], The Co-Operative Mechanism Between the Littoral States
and User States on Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore, at 2 n.1, IMO Doc. IMO/SGP 2.1/1 (Aug. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/pdf/spore-mtg-co-op-mechan-0709 04.pdf [hereinafter Cooperative Mechanism].
130. Id. para. 4.
131. Singapore Statement, supra note 84.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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with the littoral States, and assist in attracting sponsors for projects and the
Aids to Navigation Fund.134
D. Overview of the New Co-operative Mechanism
The Co-operative Mechanism is intended to implement Article 43 of
the LOS Convention, which provides that user States and States bordering
a strait should, by agreement, cooperate on navigational safety and shipsource pollution.135 This is the first time that Article 43 has been
implemented for a strait used in international navigation. Article 43 reads
as follows:
User States and States bordering a strait should by agreement
cooperate:
(a) in the establishment and maintenance in a strait of necessary
navigational and safety aids or other improvements in aid of
international navigation; and
(b) for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from
ships.
The Co-operative Mechanism consists of three elements: a Cooperation
Forum, an Aids to Navigation Fund, and specific projects.136 The
Cooperation Forum is intended to promote open dialogue and discussions
between the littoral States, user States, and other interested stakeholders.
The Aids to Navigation Fund (Fund) is intended to enable user States, and
other stakeholders, to voluntarily enhance navigational aids and thereby
improve navigational safety and environmental protection.137 Through the
TTEG, the littoral States agreed on six specific projects to enhance safety
and environmental protection in the Straits and requested user States to
support these projects.138 The six projects are:

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Singapore Statement, supra note 84. See also Press Release, Gov’t of Sing., CoOperative Mechanism for Straits of Malacca and Singapore Receives Strong International
Support (June 9, 2007) add. (Background Information), available at http://www.mpa.gov.
sg/infocentre/pdfs/background_info_co-op_mech_projects.pdf (providing background
information on projects under the Co-operative Mechanism).
137. Co-Operative Mechanism, supra note 129, annex 4 at 1.
138. Id. at 4 n.3.
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1. The removal of wrecks in the traffic separation scheme (TSS);
2. Cooperation and capacity building in relation to the OPRC-HNS
Protocol;139
3. A demonstration project placing class B automatic identification
system (AIS) transponders on small ships;
4. Setting up tide, current and wind measurement systems;
5. The replacement and maintenance of aids to navigation;
6. The replacement of aids to navigation damaged in the 2004 tsunami.140
The littoral States have taken steps to implement the Co-operative
Mechanism. The first meeting of the Aids to Navigation Fund Committee
was held April 16-17, 2008 in Penang, Malaysia.141 The Committee was
comprised of the littoral States and the contributors.142 At the meeting, the
Fund was formally launched and the Fund Committee formalized the rules
of governance and administration for the Fund.143 Currently, the first work
activity of the Fund is an initial site survey of navigation aids to determine
the maintenance and replacement work that is required.144 The Nippon
Foundation of Japan is contributing approximately 1.4 million dollars to
fund the cost of the site survey.145 Other contributions to the Fund that
have been pledged are 100,000 dollars each from the Republic of Korea
and the United Arab Emirates, and 1 million dollars from the Middle East
Navigation Aids Service (MENAS).146 Greece will also be contributing
approximately 1 million dollars to the Fund through the IMO trust fund.147
Finally, China and Japan have also indicated their intention to contribute
to the Fund.148
The response of user States to the projects has been very positive. The
United States has expressed interest in exploring the possibility of
contributing to Project 1, which addresses the removal of wrecks in the
traffic separation scheme (TSS). China, the United States, and Australia

139. See OPRC-HNS Protocol, supra note 30. As of October 31, 2008, there were twentyone parties to the Protocol, including Singapore and Japan.
140. Id.
141. Protection of Vital Shipping Lanes, supra note 109.
142. Id. at 2.
143. Id. at 3.
144. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting, at 14, IMO Doc.
C 100/SR.4 (June 17, 2008) (on file with the Ocean and Coastal Law Journal).
145. Protection of Vital Shipping Lanes, supra note 109.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Presentations at the International Symposium on Safety and Protection of the Marine
Environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (Nov. 24, 2008) (notes on file with
author).
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have offered to fund parts of Project 2, covering cooperation and capacity
building in relation to the OPRC-HNS Protocol. Australia, Japan, and
Korea have offered assistance for Project 3 to demonstrate the placement
of AIS transponders on small ships. China and the United States have
offered assistance on Project 4 to establish tide, current, and wind measurement systems. The Nippon Foundation has contributed close to 1.4 million
dollars to the Fund for the site survey to aid Project 5, which addresses the
replacement and maintenance of aids to navigation. The Japanese
government will be providing approximately 200,000 dollars toward
Project 5. Finally, China has undertaken to provide all of the funding for
Project 6 to replace all of the aids to navigation destroyed in the 2004
tsunami.149
E. Evaluation of the New Co-operative Mechanism
The Co-operative Mechanism devised by the littoral States, in
consultation with the IMO and user States, is a historic breakthrough. The
Co-operative Mechanism goes beyond Article 43 in two ways. First, it
clarifies that the IMO has a role in the mechanism as a facilitator. Second,
it calls for participation by non-State entities, including the shipping
industry and other stakeholders.
The Cooperation Forum will enable user States and other stakeholders
to work together with the littoral States to identify new projects to enhance
safety, security, and environmental protection in the Straits. User States
and other stakeholders who contribute to the Aids to Navigation Fund will
have a say in the management and operation of the Fund. These
mechanisms will ensure that user States and other stakeholders who
cooperate with the littoral States will be given a voice in the projects, the
Fund, and the Cooperation Forum.
The Co-operative Mechanism is likely to be successful for three
reasons. First, the mechanism is initiated and driven by the littoral States
and it is consistent with the principles set out by the littoral States in the
2005 Batam Statement. It recognizes the sovereignty, jurisdiction, and
primary responsibility of the littoral States in the Straits. Furthermore, it
is consistent with international law, specifically, the LOS Convention.
Second, it recognizes that the IMO, user States, and other stakeholders have
a role in cooperating with the littoral States. Cooperative stakeholders are
provided a voice in the management and operation of the mechanisms.

149. Id.
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Third, because it is inclusive, open and flexible, it will be possible to adapt
the Co-operative Mechanism to meet changing circumstances.
F. The Co-operative Mechanism and Security in the Straits
The Co-operative Mechanism is thus far limited to enhancing safety
and environmental protection. It does not include any measures to enhance
maritime security in the Straits. However, security in the Straits is a serious
concern for many. The IMO commenced the Protection of Vital Shipping
Lanes initiative because of the concern for security of the shipping lanes.
In 2005, the littoral States were primarily motivated to enhance their
cooperation concerning the Straits because of concerns with maritime
security after the September 11, 2001 incident. Another concern for the
littoral States was the escalating risk to international shipping from piracy
and armed robbery against ships in the Straits.
The 2005 Batam Statement contains several paragraphs that suggest
that the process was intended by the Ministers to enhance cooperation on
the Straits so as to improve security, safety, and environmental protection.
The 2005 Batam Statement provided that the Ministers agree to establish
a TTEG on maritime security.150 A TTEG on maritime security was also
mentioned in the 2006 Kuala Lumpur Statement.151 However, there is no
mention of it in the 2007 Singapore Statement.152 Therefore, it appears that
the littoral States had second thoughts about the need for including
maritime security in the Co-operative Mechanism and either deferred or
abandoned the idea of establishing a TTEG on maritime security. Instead,
it appears that they have left cooperative measures to enhance maritime
security to the defense forces of the littoral States. The 2007 Singapore
Statement, for example, commends the joint efforts of the littoral States and
their armed forces in contributing to the security of the Straits through the
Malacca Straits Sea Patrols and the “Eyes in the Sky” maritime air
patrols.153
Thus, the new Co-operative Mechanism for the Straits appears to be
limited, at least for the time being, to the enhancement of safety and
environmental protection in the Straits.

150. 2005 Batam Statement, supra note 111.
151. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Kuala Lumpur Statement on Enhancement of Safety,
Security and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, at 3-4,
IMO Doc. IMO/KUL 1/4 (Sept. 20, 2006), available at http://www.imo.org/includes/
blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D15677/kualalumpurstatement.pdf.
152. See Singapore Statement, supra note 84.
153. Id. at 4.
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The Co-operative Mechanism could be extended to include cooperation
to enhance maritime security in the Straits if two conditions are followed.
First, any arrangements, under the Co-operative Mechanism, between
littoral States and user States must be consistent with the principles set out
in the 2005 Batam Statement. This will ensure that such cooperation does
not undermine or infringe the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the littoral
States. It will also ensure that any cooperative measures are consistent with
international law, specifically, the LOS Convention. Second, maritime
security issues in cooperative arrangements should be limited to the
purview of the IMO and the national agencies responsible for maritime and
IMO administration. This will ensure that the Co-operative Mechanism
will not intrude into areas under the purview of other ministries or
agencies. Furthermore, this will limit the Co-operative Mechanism to
dealing with ship and port security through the implementation of the ISPS
Code and the other measures adopted by the IMO in 2002 to enhance
maritime security. It could also include cooperative measures to combat
piracy and offenses under both the 1988 SUA Convention154 and its 2005
SUA Protocol.155
Matters within the purview of the IMO and the national agencies
responsible for maritime administration are of direct interest to user States
and other stakeholders such as shipping companies. Should the security
situation in the Straits deteriorate, the users of the Straits should have the
opportunity to discuss these issues with the littoral States at the
Cooperation Forum. Also, projects could be developed by the littoral
States so that user States, under the Co-operative Mechanism, could assist
the littoral States in enhancing maritime security. For example, user States
could participate in projects to enhance security in ports along the Malacca
Strait by providing technical and material assistance on how to implement
the ISPS Code. User States could also assist the littoral States in
implementing their obligations under other IMO regulations and circulars
on maritime security.

154. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation art. 3, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter SUA 1988]. As of October
31, 2008, 149 States were parties to the Convention, but neither Indonesia nor Malaysia
were parties.
155. See Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Oct. 14, 2005 [2005] A.T.N.I.F. 30, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/notinforce/2005/30.html [hereinafter 2005
SUA Protocol].
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO ENHANCE
SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE STRAITS
Most of the projects proposed under the Co-operative Mechanism seek
to enhance the safety of navigation in the Straits. To deal with the threat
of ship-source pollution in the Straits, additional cooperative measures
between the littoral States and user States are required. Additional
measures to enhance environmental protection in the Straits should include:
1. Cooperative measures to assist the littoral States in ratifying
and implementing all of the annexes to MARPOL,156 including
the provision of adequate reception facilities in major ports in
the littoral States;
2. Cooperative measures to assist the littoral States in combating
intentional illegal discharges of oil and oily waste in the Straits;
3. Cooperative measures to assist the littoral States both in
ratifying and implementing OPRC,157 and OPRC-HNS,158 and
in working with user States, and the private sector, to develop
contingency plans for a major transboundary incident
involving oil or hazardous substances in the Straits;
4. Cooperative measures to assist the littoral States both in
ratifying and implementing CLC 1992,159 Fund 1992,160 and
the 2001 Bunker Convention,161 and in harmonizing their
implementing legislation so that they could more efficiently
and effectively manage the liability and compensation issues
arising from a major transboundary oil pollution incident in the
Straits;
5. Cooperative measures to assist the littoral States in ratifying
and implementing other IMO conventions on ship-source
pollution, including the anti-fouling162 and ballast water163
conventions.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

MARPOL, supra note 22.
OPRC, supra note 29.
OPRC-HNS Protocol, supra note 30.
1992 CLC, supra note 31.
1992 Fund, supra note 32.
Bunker Convention, supra note 33.
Anti-Fouling, supra note 24.
Ballast Water, supra note 23.
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With respect to maritime security, there are three specific measures that
the littoral States should take, outside the Co-operative Mechanism, to
build a common legal framework for enhancing security in the Straits.
First, to enhance maritime domain awareness, the three littoral States
should establish arrangements to share information among themselves and
the other maritime powers. This would provide the ability to receive,
analyze, and exchange information concerning maritime terrorism threats.
If there is a serious terrorist threat in the Straits, the defense and security
forces of the littoral States must be able to react quickly and coordinate
their actions. The importance of such coordination was recognized in the
2005 Batam Statement, which supported further strengthening of
cooperation between the chiefs of defense forces.164 Furthermore, many are
hopeful that the new Command and Control Center, established by
Singapore, will serve as an impetus for greater information sharing.
Additionally, the ReMIX information sharing platform may also assist in
this endeavor.
Second, the three littoral States should ratify and implement the 1988
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (SUA 1988),165 and the 2005 Protocol.166 The 2005
Protocol, as previously mentioned, updated SUA 1988 in light of threats to
maritime security after the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001.167
Together, SUA 1988 and the 2005 Protocol provide useful tools for
combating piracy and acts of maritime terrorism. Both SUA 1988 and the
2005 Protocol are consistent with the LOS Convention and with the 2005
Batam Statement. Although the 2005 Protocol establishes new boarding
provisions, the new provisions are consistent with the two fundamental
principles of international law on jurisdiction: that ships on the high seas
are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State, and that coastal
States have the exclusive right to exercise jurisdiction in waters under their
sovereignty.168 Under the 2005 Protocol, boarding of suspect ships can
only occur seaward of the outer limit of the territorial sea and only with the
express consent of the flag State.169 In addition, the flag State is permitted
to place conditions on the boarding of its vessels.170 The boarding

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

2005 Batam Statement, supra note 111.
SUA 1988, supra note 154.
2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 155.
Id.
Id. art. 8.
Id.
Id.
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provisions contain extensive safeguards to ensure that the interests of the
flag State, the crew, the ship owner, and the cargo owner are protected.171
Third, the three littoral States should review and harmonize their
domestic legislation on maritime terrorism and other criminal activities at
sea. They should review their arrangements for mutual assistance in
criminal matters in order to institute new measures that will make it easier
to prosecute or extradite persons who commit crimes in the Straits. The
three littoral States should also harmonize their national legislation
implementing the 1988 SUA and its 2005 Protocol. This effort may be
assisted by a previous attempt at uniformity in domestic legislation on
maritime offenses—the draft guidelines for national legislation on maritime
criminal acts prepared by Comité Maritime International and submitted to
the Legal Committee of the IMO in August 2007.172
V. CONCLUSION
In recent years, Singapore has made a concerted effort to enhance
navigational safety and environmental protection in its port and waters. It
has taken an active role in the activities of the IMO, and effectively
implemented almost all of the relevant IMO conventions on navigational
safety and ship-source pollution. It has been relatively easy for Singapore
to take these measures because it is a small, developed country, and a
leading international maritime center.
Singapore has been cooperating with Indonesia and Malaysia to
enhance navigational safety and environmental protection in the Straits
since the 1970s. This cooperation reached a new level in 2007, when the
three States established a new Co-operative Mechanism for the Straits in
order to implement Article 43 of the LOS Convention. The new Cooperative Mechanism provides a role for user States, and other
stakeholders, in enhancing navigational safety and environmental
protection in the Straits. The new mechanism is likely to succeed because
it is consistent with international law and does not infringe on the
sovereignty and jurisdiction of the littoral States. However, further

171. For more information on the SUA 1988 and the 2005 Protocol see Robert Beckman,
The 1988 SUA Convention and the 2005 SUA Protocol: Tools to Combat Piracy, Armed
Robbery and Maritime Terrorism, MAR. AFF., Winter 2006, at 1-24, reprinted in LLOYD’S
MIU HANDBOOK OF MARITIME SECURITY 187-200 (Rupert Herbert-Burns et al. eds., 2009).
172. See Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Maritime Criminal Acts: Draft Guidelines for
National Legislation, IMO Doc. LEG 93/12/1 (Aug. 15, 2007), available at http://www.
comitemaritime.org/cmidocs/pdf/Crim_acts.pdf.
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measures can be taken, under the Co-operative Mechanism, to deal with the
threat of ship-source pollution in the Straits.
Since 2002, Singapore has given high priority to maritime security in
its port and surrounding waters. It acted swiftly to fully implement the
ISPS Code and the other measures adopted by the IMO in the 2002
amendments to SOLAS. Singapore also adopted a number of unilateral
measures to enhance maritime security in its port and surrounding waters.
Among these measures was the establishment of a national coordinating
agency.
Singapore has cooperated with Indonesia and Malaysia to enhance
maritime security through both patrols of the Malacca Straits and the
information-sharing scheme with Indonesia. Nonetheless, further measures
can be taken by the three States to enhance security in the Straits. Such
measures could include the implementation of SUA 1988 and its 2005
Protocol, and the harmonization of domestic legislation on maritime crimes.
Singapore recognizes that maritime security threats require cooperation
on information sharing at the regional and international levels. Therefore,
it has worked with Indonesia and Malaysia to enhance security in the
Straits by sharing information, adopting a system of coordinated patrols,
and agreeing to host the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre. In addition,
Singapore has cooperated with the United States on the PSI and CSI, and
it has supported enhanced cooperation in venues such as the Western
Pacific Naval Symposium.
Through the construction of the Changi 2 complex, and the
development of ReMIX, Singapore will soon be in a position to serve as a
venue for enhanced information sharing and cooperation with both regional
and international partners. Singapore has close relations with the United
States and good relations with the rising maritime powers of China, Japan,
and India. It is centrally located on a critically important strait that lies
between China and Japan to the east, and India to the west. If Singapore
can develop an information sharing scheme that does not threaten the
sovereignty of its neighbors or provoke big power rivalries, it has the
potential to make an even more significant contribution to maritime
security in the region.

